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Abstract
We introduce simple guilt into a generic prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game and solve for the
equilibria of the resulting psychological game. It is shown that for all guilt parameters, it is
a pure strategy equilibrium that both players defect. But, if the guilt parameter surpasses a
threshold, a mixed strategy equilibrium and a pure strategy equilibrium in which both players
cooperate emerge. We implement three payoff constellations of the PD game in a laboratory
experiment and find in line with our equilibrium analysis that first- and second-order beliefs
are highly correlated and that the probability of cooperation depends positively on these
beliefs. Finally, we provide numerical evidence on the degree of guilt cooperators experience.
Keywords: Psychological game theory, Guilt, Prisoner’s dilemma.
JEL classification codes: C72, C91.
1 Introduction
The observation that individual (expected) payoff maximization may lead to a socially undesirable
(Pareto inefficient) outcome in the presence of public goods/externalities is central to microeco-
nomic theory. Much of the research dedicated to this problem has focused on the redesign of
institutions in order to re-establish efficiency: famously known are the internalization of external-
ities in a competitive equilibrium environment – for example, through Pigouvian taxes – and the
elicitation of true preferences via the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism in a voluntary contribu-
tion setting. If successfully implemented, the effects of the associated policies (e.g., the assignment
of fishing rights in a local community to avoid overharvesting) have powerful benefits, however
there are situations where the decision makers fail to come to an agreement and where it seems
thus very difficult to escape from the free-rider problem (e.g., negotiations about contamination
rights). It is thus important to understand how severely the free-rider problem affects the out-
come and to analyze the underlying motives that cause agents to take a more or a less pro-social
behavior.
∗We are grateful to Amber Heijne, Martin Strobel and Peter Werner for their valuable advices. Financial support
from the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness, through project ECO2015-65701-P, is gratefully
acknowledged.
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The literature on behavioral/experimental economics has addressed these questions in vari-
ous settings, the simplest and most canonical one probably being the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
game. In fact, by now it is well-established that a non-negligible fraction of subjects participat-
ing in laboratory experiments decides to cooperate in the PD game even though they should not
do so from a purely materialistic point of view (see, Chaudhuri, 2011, for an overview). Ratio-
nalizations of this behavior include other regarding preferences – among which we would like to
highlight models of altruism (cf. Andreoni, 1990), inequality aversion (cf. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999;
Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) and preferences for efficiency (cf. Engelmann and Strobel, 2004) –,
intentions/reciprocity (cf. Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher,
2006; Cox et al., 2007), and emotions (cf. Elster 1998; Eisenberg, 2000).
The literature in social psychology (cf. Baumeister et al., 1994) emphasizes the role of guilt
for the maintenance, protection, and strengthening of interpersonal relationships. This emotion
motivates individuals in particular to exhibit pro-social behavior. In the economic literature,
Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007, 2009) define simple guilt as the degree by which player i suffers
from letting another player j down towards her payoff expectation. Since the payoff expectations
of player j depend on her first-order beliefs about the strategy of player i, the expected let-down
of player i towards player j is related to i’s second-order beliefs. That is, the utility function
of the players depend on second-order beliefs. Evidence on the prevalence of guilt motives in
experimental settings include Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) who study trust games with pre-
play communication, Miettinen and Suetens (2008) who consider a PD game with voluntary pre-
play communication that also introduces a penalty for unilateral defectors, Dufwenberg et al.
(2011) who focus on framing effects in public good games, Batigalli et al. (2013) who consider
games of strategic information transmission, and Dhami et al. (forthcoming) who theoretically
relate reciprocity, simple guilt, and intentions in a public goods game to each other and establish
experimentally, using the strategy-method, that second-order beliefs have a significant effect on
actions. Our paper aims at contributing to this literature by interpreting the experimental data
as the outcome of a mixed strategy equilibrium of the psychological game (cf. Geanakoplos et al.,
1989) induced by simple guilt and by determining, for various payoff constellations, the degree of
guilt aversion that is consistent with the experimental data.
In our theoretical analysis, we introduce simple guilt into a symmetric PD game and solve
for the equilibria of the resulting psychological game. The crucial consequence of introducing
psychological costs in the form of simple guilt into the utility function is that player i lets player
j down by a strictly positive amount only if she expects player j her to contribute with a strictly
positive probability, but she finally decides to defect. That is, psychological costs can only be
positive if a player defects, never if she cooperates. This insight leads to the following equilibrium
specification (Proposition 1).
(a) Defection for both players remains a pure strategy equilibrium for all values of the guilt
parameter. The idea is that if player i is sure that player j thinks that player i defects
with probability 1, then there is no psychological cost of defection and the standard analysis
applies.
(b) For sufficiently high guilt parameters, the pure strategy profile in which both players co-
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operate can be sustained as an equilibrium. The reason is that the benefits from reducing
psychological costs to 0 (by cooperating instead of defecting) more than offset the associated
loss in material payoffs.
(c) For guilt parameters that surpass the threshold, there is also a mixed strategy equilibrium.
(d) There is no asymmetric equilibrium in pure or mixed strategies.
In our experiment, we consider three different payoff configurations that allow us to assess the
robustness of our results. Games are played one-shot. It is our main objective to interpret
experimental behavior as the mixed strategy equilibrium and derive from there the degree of guilt
that is consistent with the data. To do that, observe that in the mixed strategy equilibrium, first-
and second-order beliefs coincide with the probability that a player cooperates (equilibrium beliefs
are correct) and therefore, we do not ask subjects only about their actions, but also elicit their
beliefs at the individual level in an incentive compatible way. For first-order beliefs we use the
Quadratic Scoring Rule; for second-order beliefs we apply the Interval Scoring Rule.
We find for all three payoff variations of the PD game that there is a high correlation between
first- and second-order beliefs and that the cooperation rate is lower than the average first- and
average second-order belief (Result 1). In fact, depending on the payoff configuration, cooperation
rates are between 0.23 and 0.26, while the first- and second-order beliefs range from 0.33 to about
0.40. The theoretical analysis also reveals that for a given guilt parameter, there is a positive
dependence of the cooperation rate on first- and second-order beliefs. Probit estimations confirm
this theoretical prediction (Result 2). Finally, to gain some insight about the degree of guilt
subjects experience, we proceed in two ways. First, by directly looking at the mixed strategy
equilibrium, the observed cooperation rates imply that the common guilt parameter is between
1.85 and 2.52, depending on the payoff configuration. Second, we also asked subjects hypothetically
about their least amount of compensation for which they are willing to switch their actions, which
provides us implicitly information about the guilt parameter at the individual level. This question
was presented to the subjects after actions had been taken and beliefs had been elicited, but
before the outcome of the PD game was presented. It turns out that the average guilt parameter
determined from the answers for the cooperators is between 2.14 and 3.52 (Result 3).
2 A model of simple guilt in the prisoner’s dilemma
There are two players i ∈ {1, 2} who have to decide simultaneously and independently between
“cooperating” (C) and “defecting” (D). That is, the strategy space of player i is equal to Si =
{C,D}. Let si ∈ Si be a particular strategy for player i. We denote generic strategy profiles by
s = (s1, s2). Material payoffs are as depicted in the bi-matrix below, where c > a > d > b and
a+ d > b+ c. Following standard conventions, player 1 selects rows and player 2 selects columns.
Also, in each particular cell of the bi-matrix, the first number corresponds to the material payoff
of player 1 and the second number to the material payoff of player 2. For example, the material
payoff of player 1 at profile s = (C,D) is π1(C,D) = b.
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C D
C a, a b, c
D c, b d, d
Let αi be the first-order belief of player i that the other player j chooses strategy sj = C. The
expected payoffs πi(si |αi) of player i from playing strategy si are then given by
πi(C |αi) = αi a+ (1− αi) b and πi(D |αi) = αi c+ (1− αi) d.
Let Gsi(sj , αj) be the amount by which player i lets player j down towards her payoff expectations
at the strategy profile s = (si, sj) given that player j holds the first-order belief αj . We assume
that
GD(C,αj) = max{0 ; πj(C |αj)− b} = αj (a− b),
GD(D,αj) = max{0 ; πi(D |αj)− d} = αj (c− d),
GC(C,αj) = max{0 ; πi(C |αj)− a} = 0,
and
GC(D,αj) = max{0 ; πj(D |αj)− c} = 0.
Replacing player j’s first-order belief about player i’s play (αj) by player i’s second-order belief
about player j’s belief about player i’s play (βi), we obtain player i’s expectation about how much
player j feels being let down towards her payoff expectations at profile s:
G̃D(C, βi) = βi (a− b),
G̃D(D,βi) = βi (c− d),
and
G̃C(C, βi) = G̃C(D,βi) = 0.
Now, let
Ui(si |αi, βi) = αi [πi(si, C)− θ · G̃si(C, βi) ] + (1− αi) [πi(si, D)− θ · G̃si(D,βi) ]
be the expected utility of player i from playing si when her first-order belief is equal to αi and her
second order-belief is equal to βi. Observe that player i is sensitive (by the common factor θ ≥ 0)
to let player j down. Then,
Ui(C |αi, βi) = αi a+ (1− αi) b
and
Ui(D |αi, βi) = αi [ c− θ · G̃D(βi, C) ] + (1− αi) [ d− θ · G̃D(βi, D) ]
= αi [ c− θ · βi (a− b) ] + (1− αi) [ d− θ · βi (c− d) ]
= αi c+ (1− αi) d− θ · βi [αi (a− b) + (1− αi) (c− d) ].
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Everything else equal, Ui(D |αi, βi) is decreasing in θ and in βi.
We are going to analyze pure and mixed strategies equilibria, so let σi ∈ Σi = [0, 1] be a mixed
strategy for player i, where σi denotes the probability that player i chooses strategy si = C. The
expected utility of player i from strategy σi is then given by
Ui(σi |αi, βi) = σi Ui(C |αi, βi) + (1− σi)Ui(D |αi, βi).
Finally, note that the psychological prisoner’s dilemma game is completely described by the set of
players N = {1, 2}, the players’ strategy spaces Σ ≡ Σ1×Σ2 = [0, 1]2, and their expected utilities
Ui(σi |αi, βi) induced by their first- and second-order beliefs.
The psychological equilibrium definition consists of two parts. First, equilibrium beliefs have to
be correct. In our case, this means that player i’s first-order belief αi coincides with the optimal
mixed strategy σ∗j of the other player j and that player i’s second-order belief βi coincides with
the first-order belief αj of the other player j, which, in turn, must be equal to σ
∗
i . Second, at the
equilibrium strategy profile σ∗ = (σ∗1 , σ
∗
2), players’ maximize expected utilities given their beliefs,
that is, for all i ∈ {1, 2} and all σi ∈ Σi, Ui(σ∗i |αi, βi) ≥ Ui(σi |αi, βi). Combining the conditions
we can say that the strategy profile σ∗ is an equilibrium of the psychological prisoner’s dilemma
game if for all players i ∈ {1, 2} and all strategies σi ∈ Σi, Ui(σ∗i |σ∗j , σ∗i ) ≥ Ui(σi |σ∗j , σ∗i ).
We find that the psychological prisoner’s dilemma game exhibits the following equilibrium
structure. First, for all θ ≥ 0, it is an equilibrium that both players defect. While this is the unique
equilibrium with purely selfish players, additional equilibria might emerge in the psychological
prisoner’s dilemma game when players feel guilt. In fact, if θ ≥ θ ≡ c−aa−b , then there are two
additional equilibria: one equilibrium in pure strategies in which both players cooperate and
another equilibrium in mixed strategies.1
′2
Proposition 1. The equilibrium structure of the psychological prisoner’s dilemma game is as
follows:
(a) For all θ ≥ 0, the strategy profile s∗ = (D,D) is an equilibrium in pure strategies.
(b) For all θ ≥ θ, the strategy profile s∗ = (C,C) is an equilibrium in pure strategies.
(c) For all θ ≥ θ, the strategy profile where both players cooperate with probability
σ∗ =
− [ a+ d− b− c+ θ (c− d) ] +
√
[ a+ d− b− c+ θ (c− d) ]2 + 4 θ (a+ d− b− c) (d− b)
2 θ (a+ d− b− c)
is the unique symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies.
(d) There are no asymmetric equilibria.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
1There exist parameter configurations for which two symmetric mixed Nash equilibria may exist in addition
to the defective equilibrium. Figure 3 in Appendix A provides an example of such a parameter configuration (for
which a+d < b+ c is a necessary condition). Since we do not use such configurations in our experiment, we abstain
from a further specification of these Proposition 1.
2The occurrence of a mixed strategy equilibrium is not unique to the presence of simple guilt, as the same feature
can be obtained with other standard extensions of the assumption that individuals are purely materialistic as well.
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3 Laboratory experiment
Since the prevalence and the intensity of guilt is not guaranteed to be insensitive to minor changes
in context or incentives (Dufwenberg et al, 2011), we consider the prisoner’s dilemma using the
three different parameter configurations as presented in Table 1. All three parameter configurations
satisfy the assumptions c > a > d > b and a+d > b+c that we imposed in our theoretical analysis.
Moreover, 2a > b + c > 2d, such that the three variations are consistent in terms of efficiency
ranking over outcomes. Relative to the PD1 configuration, it is less risky for the players to
cooperate in the PD2 configuration, in the sense that the sucker payoff that is obtained in case the
opponent did not cooperate is less detrimental for her payoff. In the PD3 configuration, players
are more tempted to defect, relative to the PD1 configuration, when they believe the opponent
will cooperate.
Configuration a b c d
PD1 10 1 12 6
PD2 10 3 12 6
PD3 10 1 14 6
Table 1: Parameter configurations used in the experiment, with payoffs expressed in ECUs.
In our experiment, we elicit via one decision screen for each player: (1) her action choice,
(2) her belief about the opponent cooperating, and (3) her belief about the opponent’s belief
about her own cooperation decision.3 We opted for this procedure because it is more consistent
with the equilibrium notion, according to which beliefs and actions form simultaneously, than a
sequential approach in which one asks first about actions and afterwards, on a different computer
screen, about beliefs. The game was neutrally framed by avoiding the labels “cooperation” and
“defection” and using the labels “Action X” and “Action Y ” instead. The first-order and second-
order beliefs were elicited in an incentive compatible way. For the two first-order beliefs, we use
the Quadratic Scoring Rule (QSR; see Offerman et al., 2009); for the second-order belief, we apply
the Interval Scoring Rule (ISR; see Schlag and van der Weele, 2009).
To elicit the first-order beliefs (henceforth, denoted by FOB), we ask how likely a subject
regards the event that the other player will choose the cooperative action (Action X). To answer
this question, subjects are provided with a slider that contains as grid points all numbers from 0
up to 100 and a triangular pointer that can be moved over the grid. The extreme values 0 and 100
correspond to the extreme beliefs “totally unlikely” and “totally likely” respectively. The answer
z ∈ [0, 1] yields a payoff of 10 ECU with probability 2 z − z2 in case the opponent indeed chooses
the cooperative action and with probability 1−z2 in case the opponent defects. While moving the
triangular pointer over the grid, the percentages in each of the two potential cases are displayed on
screen in real time so that participants are at any time aware of the consequences of their choices.
For the second-order beliefs (henceforth, SOB), the same type of slider is used, but instead of
one value, two values x and y have to be chosen. These two values indicate the lower- and upper-
3A screenshot of the description of the game as displayed throughout the experiment can be found in Figure 4 in
Appendix C. Screenshots for the decisions (1)–(3) can be found in Figure 5. Results are disclosed to the participants
on a screen as in Figure 7.
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bound of the interval that participants believe to contain the value z chosen by their opponent
when asked about his first-order belief. In case the value z indeed happens to be contained in the
interval [x, y], the sender gets a payoff of 10 ECU with probability (1− (y − x))2 and nothing for
sure in case the value z is outside the interval [x, y]. Note that in the ISR mechanism, the payoff
corresponding to a correct guess is decreasing in the size of the chosen interval.
Note that, like e.g. Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000), Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), Vanberg
(2011) and Peeters et al. (2015), we use self-reported first- and second-order beliefs in order to
investigate guilt in the prisoner’s dilemma. As argued by Bellemare et al. (2017) using self-reported
second-order beliefs, leaves these beliefs more ‘endogenous’ in comparison to alternative methods
where second-order beliefs are induced either directly by communicating the self-reported first-
order beliefs of the other player (cf. Ellingsen et al., 2010) or via a strategy method where action
choices are made for any possible first-order belief the other player may hold (cf. Khalmetski et al.,
2015; Dhami et al., forthcoming). By inducing beliefs, a signal about the other player’s thoughts
about how to play the game are communicated. Observed cooperative behavior may then be less
unconditional than what can be obtained by self-reported beliefs where no signal about the other
player’s thoughts are provided. Moreover, we elicit beliefs only with regard to the choices and the
beliefs of the player subjects are actually matched with rather than asking them about average
population choices and beliefs as is done in e.g. Ridinger and McBride (2016), who focus on norm
compliance rather than on guilt.
Finally, for each subject, one of the three decisions was independently chosen for actual pay-
ment, with ECU being exchanged in Euros on a one-to-one basis. The feedback screen revealed the
decisions of both participants in a pair, the payoff relevant decision, and the final payoff in Euros.
Subjects knew from the beginning that feedback about actions and beliefs will be provided at the
end of the experiment. Before the results screen was presented, we asked the participants for the
least amount of compensation (in ECU) for which they are willing to switch to the other action.
In order to avoid deception, we did not implement an actual switch of action, and accordingly
did not provide incentives for a truthful revelation (e.g. by means of a BDM mechanism). It was
made explicit to the participants that this question was hypothetical (see Figure 6).
In the post-experimental questionnaire, we elicit information on the participants’ gender, risk
attitude, and propensity to experience guilt. The participants risk attitude is elicited, as suggested
in Dohmen et al. (2011), by asking them to answer the question “How do you see yourself: Are
you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?”
by ticking a box on on a scale from 0 to 10, where the value 0 means “not at all willing to take
risks” and the value 10 means “very willing to take risks”. To elicit their propensity towards the
self-conscious feelings of guilt, we use the Guilt and Shame Proneness Scale (GASP) developed
by Cohen et al. (2011). The GASP contains two guilt subscales that assess negative behavior-
evaluations (NBEs) and repair action tendencies following private transgressions. The former
subscale captures feeling bad about how one acted; the latter captures action tendencies (i.e.,
behavior or behavioral intentions) focused on correcting or compensating for transgression (such
as for having violated a social norm). We consider the Guilt-NBE subscale most relevant in the
context of the present situation. For this subscale participants have to answer the following four
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questions: (1) “After realizing you have received too much change at a store, you decide to keep
it because the salesclerk doesn’t notice. What is the likelihood that you would feel uncomfortable
about keeping the money?”, (2) “You secretly commit a felony. What is the likelihood that you
would feel remorse about breaking the law?”, (3) “At a coworker’s housewarming party, you spill
red wine on their new cream-colored carpet. You cover the stain with a chair so that nobody notices
your mess. What is the likelihood that you would feel that the way you acted was pathetic?”, and
(4) “You lie to people but they never find out about it. What is the likelihood that you would feel
terrible about the lies you told?”. Answers are given on a 7-point Likert scale, where the value 1
means “very unlikely” and the value 7 means “very likely”, and their final score on this subscale
is the average response given.
The experiments were conducted in the experimental laboratory at Maastricht University in
March 2017. We recruited undergraduate students from various disciplines via ORSEE (Greiner,
2015). Participants operated in one of three possible payoff configuration (PD1, PD2 or PD3).
All interactions took place anonymously via computer clients that were connected to a central
server. The experiments were programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). In total 278 students
participated in the experiment: 90 in PD1, 92 in PD2 and 96 in PD3. A typical session lasted
about 40 minutes and the average payoff was about 10.28 Euros. Instructions and screenshots are
provided in Appendices B and C.4
4 Results
Figure 1 depicts the set of all symmetric equilibria as a function of the guilt parameter θ. It can be
observed that in the mixed strategy equilibrium, lower cooperation rates go together with higher
guilt parameters. This may a priori be counterintuitive, but has a relatively simple explanation.
The expected utility from defecting
Ui(D |αi, βi) = αi c+ (1− αi) d− θ · βi [αi (a− b) + (1− αi) (c− d) ]
depends on θ · βi, which shows that second-order beliefs and guilt intensity are perfect substi-
tutes. Then, since a higher cooperation rate implies higher equilibrium second-order beliefs, more
cooperation reduces the guilt parameter in this equilibrium.
In our data analysis, we proceed as follows. First, we provide some summary statistics (Sec-
tion 4.1). Then, we study the presence of guilt motives in the prisoner’s dilemma game in two
different ways. First, for a given guilt parameter θ and given first-order belief αi, Ui(D |αi, βi) is
decreasing in βi, while the expected utility from cooperating Ui(C |αi, βi) = αi a + (1 − αi) b is
independent of βi. Subjects with higher second-order beliefs should have thus more incentive to
cooperate everything else fixed (Section 4.2). Since θ is not directly observable, we also follow a
4All experiments were conducted with the informed consent of healthy adult subjects who were free to withdraw
from participation at any time. Only individuals who voluntarily entered the experiment recruiting database were
invited, and informed consent was indicated by electronic acceptance of an invitation to attend an experimental
session. The experiments were conducted following the peer-approved procedures established by Maastricht Uni-
versity’s Behavioral and Experimental Economics Laboratory (BEElab). Our study was approved by the BEElab
at a public ethics review and project proposal meeting that is mandatory for all scholars wishing to use the BEElab
facilities.
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Figure 1: The set of symmetric equilibria as a function of the parameter θ for the parameter configurations
used in the experiment (blue: PD1, green: PD2, red: PD3).
second indirect route. Given the cooperation rate in the experiment, we calculate from Figure 1
the common guilt parameter θ that is consistent with the mixed strategy equilibrium. We then
use the individual θi that are implicitly reported through the hypothetical BDM mechanism to
see how the means of these individually reported θi relate to the equilibrium θ (Section 4.3).
4.1 Summary statistics
Table 2 presents summary statistics on participant characteristics and their decisions in the ex-
periment. Kruskal-Wallis tests do not indicate any differences in the participants’ characteristics
concerning gender, risk-attitude, and the answers to the post-experimental questionnaire across the
three variations of the prisoner’s dilemma (the corresponding two-sided p-values are p = .9310,
p = .7177, and p = .7888 respectively). This means that eventual differences in results across
games should be attributed to the variation in the incentive provided by the game parameters
(including θ) rather than potential subject pool biases.
PD1 PD2 PD3
Gender (1=Male) 0.4333 (0.4983) 0.4565 (0.5008) 0.4583 (0.5009)
Risk attitude (0–10) 6.3222 (1.9593) 6.2065 (2.0410) 6.3438 (2.0917)
Guilt-NBE (1–7) 5.0000 (1.2196) 4.9592 (1.2136) 4.8776 (1.2242)
Cooperation 0.2667 (0.4447) 0.2391 (0.4289) 0.2292 (0.4225)
First-order belief 0.4057 (0.2213) 0.3987 (0.2886) 0.3338 (0.2582)
Second-order belief 0.3995 (0.2008) 0.4051 (0.2671) 0.3911 (0.2522)
Table 2: Summary statistics: means and standard deviations.
Average cooperation rates differ slightly between game variations, with 26.67% cooperation
in PD1, 23.91% cooperation in PD2, and 22.92% cooperation in PD3. These differences are not
significant according to the Kruskal-Wallis test (p = .8293). The average first-order beliefs range
from 0.3338 in treatment PD3 to 0.4057 in treatment PD1. The Kruskal-Wallis test is weakly
significant (p = .0645), and we then find with the help of Dunn’s test with Bonferroni correction
that there is a significant difference between PD1 and PD3 (p = .0338) but not for the other
two comparisons (PD1 vs. PD2: p = .7156; PD1 vs. PD3: p = .1741). Finally, a Kruskal-Wallis
test reveals that the average midpoints of the reported second-order intervals are not significantly
9
different across game variations (p = .8458).
Comparing participants’ choices within game variation, we find that average cooperation rates
are substantially below the average first- and second-order beliefs. Figure 2 presents scatter plots
of the combinations of first-order and the midpoints of the second-order interval beliefs for all
subjects in the three different game configurations. For each game variation the two beliefs show a
high level of correlation, with the correlation coefficients being 0.8013 for PD1, 0.7335 for PD2, and














































Figure 2: Combination of elicited first- and second-order beliefs in subsequently PD1, PD2 and PD3.
Result 1. Cooperation rates are lower than first- and second-order beliefs. First- and second-
order beliefs correlate highly. There do not seem to be important differences between the game
variations.
4.2 Beliefs and cooperation
In this subsection, we analyze whether the cooperation decision depends on the first- and second-





= (1 + θ βi) · (a+ d− b− c) > 0,
which suggests a positive dependence of first-order beliefs on the rate of cooperation. Moreover,





= 0 + θ [αi (a− b) + (1− αi) (c− d) ] ≥ 0.
Our model therefore also predicts a positive correlation between the cooperation decision and the
second-order beliefs.
We perform probit regressions to test the above-mentioned hypotheses. Columns (1), (2),
(4) and (5) in Table 3, with beliefs separately included, reveal that, consistent with our two
hypotheses, the marginal effects of first- and second-order beliefs on cooperation rates are positive
and significant in all game variations. However, when first- and second-order beliefs are jointly
included as regressors, in Columns (3) and (6), we find that in PD1 and PD2 only the second-order
beliefs have a significant impact on cooperation behavior, while in PD3 only the first-order beliefs
have a significant impact.
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Prisoner’s dilemma 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First-order belief 1.6339∗∗∗ 0.6517 1.6883∗∗∗ 0.6123
Second-order belief 2.3196∗∗∗ 1.8729∗∗∗ 2.4606∗∗∗ 2.0168∗∗∗
Gender −0.3124 −0.5351 −0.4905
Risk attitude 0.6157 0.5792 0.6116
Guilt-NBE 0.6670 0.4820 0.6069
Pseudo R-squared 0.2334 0.3138 0.3261 0.2632 0.3495 0.3591
Prisoner’s dilemma 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First-order belief 1.3931∗∗∗ 0.8238∗ 1.4110∗∗∗ 0.8497∗
Second-order belief 2.1631∗∗∗ 1.8534∗∗∗ 2.1112∗∗∗ 1.8384∗∗∗
Gender 0.1342 0.0211 0.0589
Risk attitude 0.5608 0.4085 −0.0775
Guilt-NBE 1.5083 0.3441 0.6613
Pseudo R-squared 0.2934 0.4133 0.4478 0.3140 0.4152 0.4493
Prisoner’s dilemma 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First-order belief 1.1713∗∗∗ 0.8599∗∗∗ 1.1848∗∗∗ 0.9540∗∗
Second-order belief 1.3437∗∗∗ 0.6348 1.2822∗∗∗ 0.4310
Gender −0.2961 −0.1934 −0.2329
Risk attitude 1.3278 1.2498 1.1889
Guilt-NBE −1.0364 −0.5071 −0.8529
Pseudo R-squared 0.2786 0.2214 0.2952 0.3193 0.2537 0.3242
Table 3: Probit regressions for the dependency of cooperation choices on first- and second-order beliefs.
Marginals (eyex) are reported. ∗ p < .1; ∗∗ p < .05; ∗∗∗ p < .01.
One notable difference in PD3 relative to PD1 and PD2 is that in PD3 the elicited second-
order beliefs are significantly larger than the elicited first-order beliefs (Wilcoxon: p = .0038), while
these beliefs are not significantly different in PD1 and PD2 (PD1: p = .5770; PD2: p = .2331).
Further inspection reveals that it are not the second-order beliefs that differ across game variations
(Krukal-Wallis: p = .8458), but that first-order beliefs are substantially lower in PD3 compared
to variations PD1 (Dunn’s: p = .0338; significant) and PD2 (p = .1741; not significant). Even
further inspection shows that this is due to the defectors (see Appendix D).
Result 2. Subjects with higher first- and second-order beliefs are more likely to cooperate. In
PD1 and PD2 (where first- and second-order beliefs are not significantly different), the second-
order beliefs are more explanatory, while in PD3 (where second-order beliefs are larger than the
first-order beliefs), the first-order beliefs are more explanatory.
4.3 Estimating the sensitivity to guilt
Using the data elicited during our experiments there are two ways to estimate subjects’ sensitivity
to guilt, as parameterized by the parameter θ in our model. The first method is to mirror the
population average cooperation rate against the mixed strategy equilibrium in Figure 1. The
average cooperation rates of 0.2667 in PD1, 0.2391 in PD2 and 0.2292 in PD3 are consistent with
the mixed strategies equilibrium interpretation with guilt parameters 2.32 in PD1, 1.85 in PD2
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and 2.52 in PD3, respectively.5
The second method is to use the data elicited in the hypothetical BDM, where subjects have to
indicate the amount Bi they would need to receive so that they are indifferent between cooperation
and defecting. For cooperators this gives us the equation
Ui(C |αi, βi) = Ui(D |αi, βi) +Bi,
from which we obtain
θi =
[αi (c− a) + (1− αi) (d− b) ] +Bi
βi [αi (a− b) + (1− αi) (c− d) ]
.
Using the reported values for αi, βi and Bi, we obtain for each cooperator their individual estimate
of the guilt sensitivity parameter θi. The average θi for cooperators is 3.10 in PD1, 2.14 in PD2
and 3.52 in PD3. The ranking obtained is similar to the ranking obtained using the first estimation
method. The numbers are a bit higher, which is explained by the sole focus on the cooperators
in the second estimation method.6 A Kruskall-Wallis test does indicate differences across game
variations (p = .0116). Dunn’s test with Bonferroni correction identifies no significant difference
between PD1 and PD3 (p = .8845), but significant differences between PD1 and PD2 (p = .0068)
and between PD2 and PD3 (p = .0368).
Result 3. Guilt obtained via mixed strategy equilibrium is consistent with choice data and is
sensitive to the payoff configuration.
If we regress the individual estimated guilt parameters of the cooperators on gender, risk attitude
and guilt-NBE, we only find a significant relation between gender and guilt in PD3: males have
higher sensitivity to guilt (see Table 4). Strikingly, there is no significant relation between the
guilt estimated in our experiment and that elicited via the guilt questionnaire. One reason for this
may be that the questions postulated in the guilt questionnaire are more oriented to social norms
in general, rather than taking into account the beliefs others may have about once behavior in the
framed circumstances.
PD1 PD2 PD3
Gender −0.0609 0.0629 0.2542∗∗
Risk attitude −0.5678 −0.2666 −3.0306
Guilt-NBE −0.1164 0.2000 0.5360
Observations 24 22 22
R-squared 0.1449 0.0447 0.2898
Table 4: OLS regressions for the dependency of the estimated guilt parameter on individual characteristics.
Marginals (eyex) are reported. ∗ p < .1; ∗∗ p < .05; ∗∗∗ p < .01.
5Doing the same exercise based on average first-order beliefs gives 1.29 for PD1, 1.02 for PD2 and 1.68 for PD3.
Doing the same for the average reported second-order beliefs gives 1.32 for PD1, 1.00 for PD2 and 1.40 for PD3.
While numbers are a bit lower when using the beliefs, the ranking across payoff variations is consistent.
6The reason to focus on the cooperators is that for four defectors the guilt parameter is not specified as they
report a second-order belief of zero, and that for 193 of the remaining 206 defectors we find a negative guilt




In this paper, we have shown theoretically that cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game can
be sustained in equilibrium if players are guilt averse. While defection always remains a pure
strategy equilibrium of the psychological game induced by guilt aversion, both a pure strategy
equilibrium in which players cooperate and a mixed strategy equilibrium appear whenever players
are sufficiently guilt averse (Proposition 1).
The data of our laboratory experiment reveals that first- and second-order beliefs are highly
correlated (Result 1) and that the action depends on these beliefs in the way suggested by the
theoretical model (Result 2). With respect to the latter of the two results, since second-order
beliefs turn out be more predictive for cooperation than first-order beliefs in two of the three PDs
that we implemented, our results provide evidence for guilt aversion being an important factor
that motivates people to cooperate, but its pivotal force being sensitive to the incentives provided.
Finally, and which we believe to be the main novelty of our study, we suggest two ways to
calculate indicators of the unobservable guilt parameter from the experimental data. First, the
cooperation rates in the experiment are consistent with the mixed strategy equilibrium specifi-
cation if the common guilt parameter is 2.32 in PD1, 1.85 in PD2, and 2.52 in PD3. Second,
since subjects are likely to differ in their guilt aversion, we also implemented a hypothetical BDM
mechanism in order to obtain information about the guilt aversion at the subject level. Under this
method, the average guilt aversion parameter of the cooperators is found to be 3.10 in PD1, 2.14
in PD2, and 3.52 in PD3. One observe that both methods rank the three PD variations identically
in terms of the guilt parameter (Result 3).
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
(a) To see that the strategy profile s∗ = (D,D) is an equilibrium in pure strategies for all θ ≥ 0
simply note that Ui(D | 0, 0) = d > b = Ui(C | 0, 0).
(b) We show that s∗ = (C,C) is an equilibrium in pure strategies whenever θ ≥ θ. Each
player gets Ui(C | 1, 1) = a from cooperating. If a player deviates and defects, her payoff is
Ui(D | 1, 1) = c− θ (a− b). Hence, Ui(C | 1, 1) ≥ Ui(D | 1, 1) as long as a ≥ c− θ (a− b). This
equation solves for θ ≥ c−aa−b .
(c) A σ ∈ (0, 1) constitutes a symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies if and only if Ui(C |σ, σ) =
Ui(D |σ, σ). That is,
σ a+ (1− σ) b = σ c+ (1− σ) d− θ · σ [σ (a− b) + (1− σ) (c− d) ].
We see that for θ = 0 this renders a solution that cannot be an equilibrium: σ = d−ba+d−b−c > 1.
We assume henceforth that θ > 0. Rewriting the previous equation we obtain that
θ (a+ d− b− c)σ2 + [ a+ d− b− c+ θ (c− d) ]σ − (d− b) = 0.
Consequently, the two possible solutions to this quadratic equation are
σ∗1,2 =
− [ a+ d− b− c+ θ (c− d) ] ±
√
[ a+ d− b− c+ θ (c− d) ]2 + 4 θ (a+ d− b− c) (d− b)
2 θ (a+ d− b− c)
.
From a+ d− b− c > 0 and c > a > d > b, we can conclude that both solutions are real and
that the smallest solution is negative and the largest solution positive. Hence, the smallest
solution cannot be an equilibrium. For the largest solution to be an equilibrium, we have to
show that its value is less than or equal to 1. That is, we have to show that√
[ a+ d− b− c+ θ (c− d) ]2 + 4 θ (a+ d− b− c) (d− b) ≤ [ a+d−b−c+θ (c−d) ]+2 θ (a+d−b−c).
Since the expressions on both sides of this inequality are positive, this inequality is satisfied
if and only if
4 θ (a+d−b−c) (d−b) ≤ 2 [ a+d−b−c+θ (c−d) ] 2 θ (a+d−b−c)+4 θ2 (a+d−b−c)2,
or
d− b ≤ [ a+ d− b− c+ θ (c− d) ] + θ (a+ d− b− c).
This inequality holds if and only if θ ≥ c−aa−b .
(d) A strategy profile where one player plays D while the other plays C with positive probability
(with beliefs being consistent with this play) cannot be an equilibrium, since D is the unique
best-response to D. Moreover, a strategy profile where one player plays C while the other
plays D with positive probability (with beliefs being consistent with this play) can also not
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be an equilibrium. First, C is the unique best-response to C if θ ≥ θ. Second, for θ < θ, while
D is the unique best-response to C, C is not a best-response to D in return. Therefore, the
only possibility to have asymmetric equilibria, is them to be in completely mixed strategies.
Suppose player j cooperates with probability σj , and player i has beliefs αi = σj and βi.
Player i is indifferent between playing C and D if and only if
U(C |σj , βi) = U(D |σj , βi).
From this we find that player j leaves player i indifferent between these two actions by
choosing7
σj = 1−
(a− c) + θ βi (a− b)
(1 + θ βi) (a+ d− b− c)
.
Similarly, we find that player i leaves player j indifferent between C and D by playing
σi = 1−
(a− c) + θ βj (a− b)
(1 + θ βj) (a+ d− b− c)
.
Equilibrium conditions require βi = σi and βj = σj , such that we obtain the system of
equations
σi = 1−
(a− c) + θ σj (a− b)




(a− c) + θ σi (a− b)
(1 + θ σi) (a+ d− b− c)
(2)
to be satisfied in an equilibrium. Inverting Equation (1), we obtain
σj =
(d− b)− (a+ d− b− c)σi
θ (c− d) + θ (a+ d− b− c)σi
. (3)
The derivatives of the right hand-sides of Equations (2) and (3) to σi are
− θ (c− b) (a+ d− b− c)
[ (a+ d− b− c) + θ (a+ d− b− c)σi ]2
and
− θ (c− b) (a+ d− b− c)
[ θ (c− d) + θ (a+ d− b− c)σi ]2
,
respectively. From c > b and a + d > b + c, it follows that both these derivative are
negative, implying that both right hand-sides are downward sloping. Moreover, we see that
the only difference between the slopes are the terms that are constant with respect to σi
in the denominator. Since all terms in the derivative are positive, we find that, one of the
curves is steeper than the other, at all σi > 0. This means that the two curves can cross at
most once on the positive domain, implying that we can have at most one (feasible) solution
to Equations (1) and (2) on the positive domain, and hence at most one mixed strategy
equilibrium. By symmetry of the game, asymmetric equilibria always come in pairs; that is,
if (σ′, σ′′) is an equilibrium, then also (σ′′, σ′) is an equilibrium. Hence, the only possible
equilibrium is symmetric, which is the equilibrium identified in part (c).



















Figure 3: The left graph plots the set of symmetric equilibria for the situation (a, b, c, d) = (10, 1, 20, 6)
where a + d < b + c and for which two mixed strategy equilibria exist for values of θ in (1.1095, 1.1111).
For a = 10 and b = 6 (as in all three variations used in the experiment), for all pairs (b, c) below the curve
in the right graph there does not exist a θ for which there are two mixed strategy equilibria. The three




Thank you for participating in the experiment. The session is going to last about 45 minutes. In
addition to the 5 Euros show up fee that you receive for your participation, you can earn additional
money depending on the decisions taken during the experiment.
In order to ensure that the experiment takes place in an optimal environment, we ask you to
respect the following rules:
• Do not speak with other participants.
• Turn off your mobile phone.
• If you have a question, raise your hand.
During the experiment, payoffs are expressed in ECU (experimental currency units). At the end
of the instructions, we will explain to you how ECUs are converted into Euros so that the money
you earned can be calculated. As usual, all information in the instructions is true. Also, the
instructions are the same for all participants.
Procedures
In the experiment, you are going to take a series of decisions using the computer terminal.
Throughout the experiment, you are randomly matched with another participant to form a pair.
Neither you nor the other participant in the pair knows or will ever learn the identity of her/his
match. In each pair, one of the two participants will be assigned the role of the row player and
the other participant will be assigned the role of the column player. The computer will randomly
determine roles within the pair at the beginning of the experiment.
The situation
The payoff table below summarizes the situation you and your match are facing.
Column
Action X Action Y
Row Action X 10 , 10 1 , 12
Action Y 12 , 1 6 , 6
The two players within a pair choose individually (that is, there is no communication between
players) and simultaneously (that is, without knowing the decision of the other player) between
Action X and Action Y. The outcome from this interaction can be observed in the payoff table.
In each cell of the table, the first number indicates the payoff of the row player and the second
number the payoff of the column player.
For example, if the row player chooses Action X and the column player chooses Action Y, then
the row player receives 1 ECU and the column player 12 ECU.
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Procedures – continued
Throughout the experiment you are given three tasks (Task A, B, and C). Task A asks you for
your action choice in the situation described above. Task B and C relate to questions of how you
think the participant you are matched with behaves (Task B) and about how you think that the
participant you are matched with thinks about your behavior (Task C). All details regarding these
questions are presented on the corresponding computer screens.
In the end of the experiment, you are going to be paid for one of the three tasks. The paid task
is chosen at random by the computer with each task being equally likely to be chosen. You will
receive 1 Euro for every ECU earned in the selected task on top of the 5 Euro show up fee.
Since your final payoff depends on your decisions, it is of utmost importance that you read the
instructions on the computer screens very carefully and think very carefully about your decision
before proceeding.
If you are not sure to fully understand the functioning of the experiment at any point in time,
please, do not hesitate to raise your hand and ask.
20
C Screenshots (PD1 and Questionnaire)
Figure 4: First screen. Instructions are briefly repeated.
Figure 5: Second screen. Via this screen we elicit the action choice, the first-order belief and the second
order belief.
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Figure 6: Third screen. On this screen we ask the hypothetical question concerning switching actions.
Figure 7: Fourth screen. Via this final screen, subjects receive feedback on the outcome.
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Figure 8: Fifth screen. Eliciting gender.
Figure 9: Sixth screen. Eliciting risk attitude.
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Figure 10: Seventh screen. Eliciting responses to GASP questions 1–6.
Figure 11: Eighth screen. Eliciting responses to GASP questions 7–12.
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Figure 12: Ninth screen. Eliciting responses to GASP questions 13–16.
25
D Cooperators vs. defectors
Table 5 presents summary statistics on participant characteristics and their reported beliefs dis-
aggregated for cooperators and defectors.
Cooperators
PD1 PD2 PD3
Gender (1=Male) 0.2916 (0.4643) 0.4545 (0.5096) 0.3636 (0.4924)
Risk attitude (0–10) 6.6667 (1.9486) 5.9091 (1.7704) 7.1818 (1.8162)
Guilt-NBE (1–7) 5.0833 (1.3864) 5.1818 (0.9518) 4.7386 (1.2014)
First-order belief 0.5867 (0.2001) 0.6741 (0.1861) 0.5886 (0.2312)
Second-order belief 0.5860 (0.1550) 0.7014 (0.1887) 0.6093 (0.1990)
Observations 24 22 22
Defectors
PD1 PD2 PD3
Gender (1=Male) 0.4848 (0.5036) 0.4571 (0.5018) 0.4865 (0.5032)
Risk attitude (0–10) 6.1970 (1.9628) 5.9857 (2.0816) 6.0946 (2.1143)
Guilt-NBE (1–7) 4.9697 (1.2196) 4.8893 (1.2830) 4.9189 (1.2360)
First-order belief 0.3398 (0.1908) 0.3121 (0.2598) 0.2580 (0.2144)
Second-order belief 0.3317 (0.1708) 0.3120 (0.2155) 0.3263 (0.2297)
Observations 66 70 74
Table 5: Summary statistics for cooperators and defectors: means and standard deviations.
For cooperators, we do not find any significant differences in reported first- and second-order
beliefs across game variations (Kruskal-Wallis: p = .3770 for FOB and p = .1156 for SOB). Also
within game variation we do not find first-order beliefs to be different from second-order beliefs
(Wilcoxon: p = .3756 for PD1, p = .3976 for PD2, and p = .9611 for PD3).
For defectors, we do not find a significant difference in reported second-order beliefs across
game variations (Kruskal-Wallis: p = .5568), but do find a significant difference for the first-order
beliefs (p = .0293). With the help of Dunn’s test with Bonferroni correction we find that reported
beliefs are lower in PD3 than in PD1 (p = .0118) but not significantly different in the other two
comparisons (PD1 vs. PD2: p = .1838; PD1 vs. PD3: p = 0.4014). Within game variation we do
not find first-order beliefs to be different from second-order beliefs in PD1 and PD2 (Wilcoxon:
p = .8754 for PD1 and p = .3797 for PD2), but first-order beliefs to be significantly lower than
the second-order beliefs in PD3 (p = .0007).
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